Brexit and Immigration: What Has the United Kingdom Learned Ten Years Later?

Ten years have passed since the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, a vote that fundamentally changed the political and constitutional direction of the United Kingdom. Among the many arguments advanced during the campaign, few were more influential than the promise of restoring control over immigration.

For many voters, Brexit was not simply about leaving the European Union. It was about recovering the ability to decide independently who could enter the country, who could remain, and under what conditions. Immigration became one of the most visible symbols of national sovereignty.

A decade later, Britain undeniably possesses greater legal control over its immigration system than it did as a member of the European Union. The principle of free movement no longer applies, immigration rules are set by Westminster, and British governments enjoy considerably more freedom to design policies according to national priorities.

In this sense, Brexit achieved one of its principal objectives.

Yet the experience of the last ten years also reveals something important. Recovering control over immigration policy does not automatically resolve immigration challenges.

Illegal crossings of the English Channel remain a major political issue. Asylum policy continues to provoke public debate. Removal and deportation procedures often encounter legal and practical difficulties. At the same time, large sectors of the British economy continue to rely upon migrant labour in order to function effectively.

These realities suggest that immigration is a far more complex issue than simply controlling entry into the country.

The British experience highlights a distinction that is frequently overlooked in political discussions. Border control and immigration governance are related, but they are not identical. A government may successfully determine who enters the country while still facing difficult questions regarding integration, social cohesion, and long-term residence.

Indeed, the most difficult questions often arise after entry rather than before it.

Once individuals settle within a country, find employment, build families, and establish social relationships, immigration becomes closely connected to broader questions of national identity and community. The central issue is no longer simply who crossed the border, but how society evaluates the process of integration.

This is where the British debate remains unfinished.

Much attention has been devoted to visas, border security, asylum procedures, and migration statistics. Far less attention has been given to defining clear standards of integration and to determining how a country should assess whether newcomers have genuinely become part of the national community.

From my perspective in Italy, this is one of the most important lessons that Brexit offers to the wider European debate.

Sovereignty matters. Border control matters. However, neither can provide a complete answer without a broader framework addressing integration itself. A modern immigration policy should not focus exclusively on admission. It should also consider participation in the labour market, knowledge of the national language, respect for the legal order, and commitment to the shared rules of society.

These elements provide tangible indicators of integration and allow a country to distinguish between those who actively contribute to the national community and those who reject that process.

Ten years after Brexit, the United Kingdom is undoubtedly more sovereign in a formal sense. Yet the British experience demonstrates that sovereignty is only the beginning of the conversation. The real challenge lies in developing policies capable not only of controlling borders, but also of governing integration in a coherent and transparent manner.

Perhaps that is the most significant lesson of Brexit after a decade: immigration policy cannot be reduced to the question of who enters the country. It must also address the equally important question of who becomes part of the national community and on what basis.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo

Lobbyist registered in the European Union Transparency Register (ID 280782895721-36)

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

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