Complementary Protection and the Governance of Migration Flows: Effective Integration as an Individual Criterion for Lawful Stay within the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” Paradigm

A Comment on the Judgment of the Tribunal of Venice, Specialised Immigration Section, 31 July 2026, Case No. 23163/2024

Fabio Loscerbo

Abstract

The judgment delivered by the Tribunal of Venice on 31 July 2026 provides an important opportunity to examine complementary protection not only as an instrument safeguarding the fundamental rights of foreign nationals, but also as a component of a rational system for governing migration and lawful residence. The Tribunal recognised the applicant’s right to obtain an Italian residence permit for special protection after finding that he had achieved a genuine degree of occupational, economic, residential and social integration. The decision was based on Article 19(1.1) of Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 in the version applicable ratione temporis, following the reform introduced by Decree-Law No. 130/2020. The judgment confirms that integration cannot be presumed merely from a foreign national’s physical presence or length of residence, but it cannot be disregarded when established through objective, coherent and mutually reinforcing evidence. Within the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm, complementary protection may be understood as an instrument for the individualised governance of lawful stay. Where a foreign national has developed an autonomous and socially embedded private life, the legal system must take that reality into account before ordering removal. Conversely, where no legally relevant process of integration has occurred, continued residence cannot be regarded as an automatic consequence of the passage of time. The judgment therefore provides a basis for moving beyond both indiscriminate regularisation and generalised return policies, in favour of a model founded on an individual, dynamic and evidence-based assessment of integration.

Keywords: complementary protection; special protection; migrant integration; Integrazione o ReImmigrazione; private life; migration governance; return policy; Article 8 ECHR; Italian immigration law.

The judgment delivered on 31 July 2026 by the Tribunal of Venice, Specialised Section for Immigration, International Protection and the Free Movement of European Union Citizens, concerned an appeal against the refusal by the Padua Police Headquarters to issue a residence permit for special protection. The proceedings were brought pursuant to Article 19-ter of Legislative Decree No. 150/2011 and sought judicial recognition of the applicant’s right to the residence permit governed by Article 19(1.1) of the Italian Consolidated Immigration Act.

The relevance of the decision extends beyond the individual dispute. It raises a broader question concerning the function that complementary protection may perform within the governance of migration flows and, more specifically, within the legal regulation of the period between entry into the territory and eventual removal.

Contemporary immigration policies tend to focus almost exclusively on two moments: admission and return. Considerably less attention is devoted to the intervening period, during which a foreign national may enter the labour market, acquire linguistic and professional skills, establish social relationships, achieve economic independence and construct a private life within the host society.

It is precisely during this intermediate period that the success or failure of migration policy is determined. A legal system that measures only the number of admissions, residence permits, irregular migrants and enforced returns, without assessing what occurs during residence, does not genuinely govern migration. It administers migration through static legal categories while overlooking the social and personal transformation of the individual.

The “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm begins with this neglected dimension. The name of the paradigm is intentionally retained in its original Italian form. It identifies a legal and policy framework under which continued residence should not be presumed from physical presence alone, while return cannot be ordered without considering the effective integration achieved by the individual and the constitutional, international and European limits governing removal.

The paradigm rejects both the assumption that physical presence must inevitably become permanent and the opposite assumption that a person may be removed without regard to the social reality developed during residence. Its central proposition is that the continuation of lawful stay should be connected to an individual assessment of integration, without prejudice to the absolute or relative prohibitions of removal deriving from fundamental rights.

The applicant in the Venice proceedings had submitted his application for special protection by certified electronic mail on 14 January 2023. That date proved decisive. Although the contested administrative decision referred to a later date of formalisation, the Tribunal found that the application had in fact been transmitted in January 2023 and was therefore governed by the legal framework introduced by Decree-Law No. 130/2020, subsequently converted into Law No. 173/2020.

That reform had restored explicit reference to Italy’s constitutional and international obligations and had expanded the scope of the prohibition of expulsion and refoulement. Under the version of Article 19(1.1) applicable to the case, removal was prohibited where it would entail a violation of the person’s right to respect for private and family life, unless overriding considerations of national security, public order or public safety justified a different outcome.

Complementary protection must be distinguished from international protection. International protection comprises refugee status and subsidiary protection and is linked, respectively, to a well-founded fear of persecution and to the risk of serious harm in the country of origin. Complementary protection operates outside those strictly defined categories. It gives effect to constitutional and international obligations that prevent the State from removing an individual where removal would result in a violation of fundamental rights.

The Italian residence permit for special protection is one of the legal instruments through which complementary protection has been implemented. It is neither a lesser form of asylum nor a general regularisation mechanism. Its function is to determine whether removal, in the individual circumstances of the case, remains legally compatible with the fundamental rights that the State is required to protect.

The contested refusal had been based on a negative opinion issued by the competent Territorial Commission. According to the Commission, the evidence submitted by the applicant concerned almost exclusively his employment and related only to a relatively recent period. On that basis, the authorities concluded that there were no substantial grounds for finding that removal from Italy would violate the applicant’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Tribunal adopted a different analytical method. It did not regard employment as an isolated fact, nor did it treat the existence of an employment contract as automatically sufficient for granting protection. Rather, it placed employment within the broader structure of the applicant’s life, taking into account the continuity of the employment relationship, economic independence, social-security contributions, housing arrangements and the relationships developed through professional and social participation.

This method is consistent with the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm. Integration cannot be presumed merely because a person has remained in Italy for a certain number of years. At the same time, integration cannot be denied where it has been demonstrated through a coherent body of objective evidence.

The passage of time does not, in itself, create an unconditional right to remain. Yet time spent in the host country is not legally empty. The relevant question is how that period has been used and what kind of social position the individual has acquired. The assessment must consider whether the foreign national has worked lawfully, paid social-security contributions, acquired autonomy, developed social relationships, complied with the legal order and participated in the life of the community.

The Tribunal also clarified the nature of judicial proceedings concerning the refusal of special protection. Such proceedings are not limited to reviewing the formal legality of the administrative decision. The ordinary court is required to determine directly whether the applicant has a substantive right to the residence permit.

For that reason, the Tribunal rejected the request formally seeking annulment of the administrative act while examining the merits of the claim for recognition of the right to special protection. The judicial proceedings were therefore characterised as proceedings for the ascertainment of a subjective right rather than as a conventional review of administrative legality.

This procedural distinction has important substantive consequences. The court is not necessarily confined to the factual situation existing when the application was submitted or when the Police Headquarters issued its refusal. It may consider subsequent circumstances where those circumstances are relevant to establishing the current existence of the claimed right.

In the case before the Tribunal, the employment relationship that the administration had regarded as too recent became progressively more stable during the proceedings. The continuation of the relationship, the increase in remuneration and the evidence of social-security contributions demonstrated that the applicant’s position was neither temporary nor merely formal. The duration of the judicial proceedings made it possible to observe the development of the integration process over time.

The Tribunal ultimately recognised special protection on the basis of circumstances that had continued to evolve after the original administrative application. The subsequent consolidation of the applicant’s position was so relevant that the court relied upon it when deciding to compensate the legal costs between the parties.

This aspect of the judgment is particularly important. Integration is not a photograph taken at a single moment. It is a process.

A foreign national may possess only an initial degree of integration when an application is lodged, which may subsequently develop into a stable social condition. Conversely, apparently successful integration may later deteriorate or prove merely formal. A serious migration policy must therefore be capable of observing individual development rather than relying exclusively on a static assessment made at the beginning of residence.

The “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm cannot be based on a single assessment conducted at the moment of entry. Nor should integration be presumed permanently once a residence permit has been granted. What is required is a dynamic evaluation capable of taking account of the development of the individual’s actual circumstances.

The Tribunal referred to the case law of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, according to which the assessment of private and family life must be comprehensive and unitary. The relevant factors must not be examined separately or atomistically. They must be assessed globally, in their mutual interaction.

This principle is fundamental. A contract of employment, considered in isolation, may not be sufficient. Housing provided by an employer may appear dependent upon the continuation of the employment relationship. A satisfactory income may be treated as a purely economic fact. A relatively short period of residence may be regarded as insufficient. When viewed together, however, those same elements may demonstrate the existence of a coherent and stable private life.

Integration does not consist of the mechanical sum of isolated indicators. It is the qualitative result of the interaction between employment, housing, social relationships, personal autonomy, length of residence, knowledge of the host society and respect for its legal rules.

The Tribunal identified three main dimensions of rootedness under the applicable legal framework. The first concerned genuine family relationships existing in Italy. The second concerned social and economic inclusion. The third related to the duration of residence and the corresponding weakening of ties with the country of origin.

These criteria do not require every applicant to demonstrate the same form of private life. Family relationships may be central in one case, while occupational and social integration may be decisive in another. What matters is the overall coherence and intensity of the life actually developed in the territory.

In the case under examination, occupational integration was central. The applicant had signed an open-ended employment contract on 18 August 2023 as a worker in the craft construction sector. The employer had already expressed a commitment to hire him during 2022. The employment relationship remained in force in 2026, as demonstrated by the applicant’s social-security record and the payslips filed during the proceedings.

The most recent payslip, relating to June 2026, recorded monthly remuneration of EUR 2,216.36. The Tribunal held that this income was sufficient not only to meet the applicant’s basic needs, but also to establish full independence from the reception system.

The reference to independence from reception deserves particular attention. The Italian system often treats the legal position of foreign nationals as static. Individuals are classified as asylum seekers, beneficiaries of protection, irregular migrants, workers or persons subject to removal. There is no sufficiently structured evaluation of the transition from dependence to autonomy.

A migration policy founded on the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm should instead measure that transition. It should determine whether the person remains dependent on public reception facilities, has developed the capacity for self-support, possesses stable accommodation, pays social-security contributions, has acquired linguistic and professional skills and participates effectively in society.

Independence from reception cannot, of course, be the sole criterion. Fundamental rights do not depend upon income, and economic vulnerability cannot automatically become a ground for removal. Such an approach would be incompatible with constitutional and international principles and would reduce human dignity to productive capacity.

This does not mean, however, that employment and economic autonomy are legally irrelevant. When the issue is whether a private life has become established, the ability to support oneself through lawful employment is an objective and verifiable factor. It is not merely a declaration of an intention to integrate, but evidence of conduct sustained over time.

The Tribunal expressly recognised the significance of employment beyond its financial dimension. It held that work had become a driving force in the consolidation of the applicant’s overall living arrangements, producing interpersonal relations and contributing to the progressive acquisition of cultural and linguistic skills.

This observation reflects the social reality of integration. Employment is not simply a source of income. It is one of the principal environments in which a person encounters the host society, learns its language, understands its institutional and social rules, assumes responsibilities and develops a social identity.

Recognition of this principle does not imply that every employed foreign national must be permitted to remain. The judgment does not establish a regularisation mechanism based solely on the existence of an employment contract. Special protection was recognised because of a broader combination of continuous employment, adequate income, social-security contributions, housing stability, personal autonomy, social rootedness and the absence of countervailing public-order considerations.

The applicant also had accommodation made available by his employer. This element was not viewed in isolation, but as further evidence of his intention to establish a stable life in the area where he worked.

The Tribunal further noted that the administration had not alleged any criminal record or conduct capable of establishing overriding grounds of national security or public order. The absence of negative elements therefore reinforced the positive assessment of the applicant’s integration.

This aspect must also be incorporated into the logic of the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm. Integration cannot be assessed solely through positive indicators such as employment, income and housing. It must also take account of individual conduct and respect for the fundamental rules of social coexistence.

It would be unreasonable to regard as fully integrated a person who, despite being employed, had engaged in serious and repeated conduct incompatible with public safety. It would be equally unreasonable to treat any criminal conviction automatically as conclusive, without examining the seriousness, recency and current relevance of the conduct.

The paradigm therefore requires an individual assessment rather than automatic favourable or unfavourable presumptions. Neither employment nor a criminal record can be assessed through a mechanical rule detached from the overall circumstances of the case.

From this perspective, complementary protection may be understood as an instrument for governing residence. It does not directly determine the number of admissions, establish annual employment quotas or replace the ordinary channels of lawful migration. It intervenes when the State must decide whether removal is still compatible with the life that a person has actually constructed in the host country.

Public debate generally remains concentrated on admission and return. One position treats the expansion of entry channels and protection measures as the primary response to migration. Another reduces migration governance to border closure, detention and enforcement of removal orders.

Both positions overlook the central stage.

Migration is not governed only when a person crosses a border or is physically removed from the territory. It is governed throughout the years of residence. During that period, migration may develop into orderly participation in social and economic life, or into prolonged marginalisation and separation from the host society.

Complementary protection, when applied according to rigorous standards, may help distinguish between individual positions. It may prevent the removal of a person whose life has become genuinely embedded in the host society. At the same time, it must not become a general amnesty based solely on the duration of irregular residence or the formal existence of employment.

This is the point at which the Venice judgment most directly intersects with the “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm.

Continued stay should correspond to a genuine process of participation, and that process should be legally recognised where it has actually occurred. ReImmigrazione should not be conceived as a collective measure directed indiscriminately against categories of foreign nationals. Within the paradigm, it describes the possible outcome of an individual legal assessment where the requirements for continued residence are absent, effective integration has not been established and no constitutional, international or European obligation prevents return.

The “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm must therefore be clearly distinguished from collective or identity-based theories of removal. Its starting point is the individual person, the legal position of that person and the evidence relating to the person’s actual conduct and social integration.

ReImmigrazione is not the ideological opposite of integration. Within the paradigm, it is the potential consequence of the absence or serious failure of an integration process, provided that the individual has no legal entitlement to remain and that removal complies with fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.

Integration, similarly, cannot be reduced to a rhetorical principle used to justify every form of continued presence. It must be demonstrated, assessed and verified.

The Venice judgment shows that this form of assessment is already possible. The Tribunal relied on concrete indicators: employment stability, continuity of the employment relationship, remuneration, social-security contributions, independence from reception, housing, social relationships, the absence of public-order concerns and the weakening of ties with the country of origin.

The structural problem is that such an assessment is currently carried out primarily in judicial proceedings, after the administration has refused the residence permit and after the individual has been compelled to bring an action before the court. The duration of litigation sometimes becomes the period during which integration is consolidated and documented.

A more rational system should anticipate this assessment.

Integration should be evaluated systematically within administrative procedures concerning residence. It should not emerge only at the pathological stage of litigation before a court. The legal order should develop transparent and adversarial procedures through which the progress of individual integration may be assessed before a refusal or removal decision becomes necessary.

The “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm proposes moving beyond static legal categories. A person cannot be defined permanently by the status held at the time of entry. The person’s circumstances may evolve positively or negatively.

An individual assessment may consider continuity of lawful employment, payment of taxes and social-security contributions, economic autonomy, housing stability, knowledge of the national language, participation in social life, compliance with legal obligations, children’s school attendance, participation in vocational training and the absence of conduct incompatible with public safety.

The value of these indicators lies in their capacity to make integration visible and verifiable. They translate an otherwise abstract concept into facts capable of being documented, evaluated by the administration and reviewed by a court.

Such indicators should not, however, be applied mechanically. It would be unacceptable to transform integration into a rigid numerical score that disregards the complexity of the person. Indicators should guide an individual administrative assessment that is reasoned, transparent and subject to effective judicial review.

The assessment should also distinguish between factors within the individual’s control and circumstances arising from structural vulnerability, illness, labour-market conditions or administrative delays. The purpose of evaluating integration cannot be to punish poverty or social fragility. Its purpose must be to identify the existence, direction and seriousness of the person’s participation in the host society.

The model must not impose cultural assimilation. Integration does not require the abandonment of the person’s original identity. It requires effective participation in the host society, knowledge and respect for its fundamental rules, the ability to interact with institutions and the development of a life that is not permanently separated from the surrounding community.

The temporal scope of the Venice judgment must nevertheless be stated precisely. The Tribunal applied Article 19(1.1) in the version introduced by Decree-Law No. 130/2020 because the application had been submitted on 14 January 2023. The decision does not establish that the same statutory framework automatically applies to applications submitted after subsequent legislative amendments.

Its immediate legal significance is therefore especially strong in proceedings governed by the earlier legal framework and in disputes concerning the correct identification of the date on which an application was lodged.

Its broader methodological importance, however, extends beyond the question of transitional law. The approach adopted by the Tribunal — individual, concrete, dynamic, comprehensive and non-atomistic — offers a general model for a more coherent migration policy.

The applicant did not obtain special protection merely because he had signed an employment contract. He obtained it because employment had become the central structure of a stable private life. It had produced economic autonomy, social-security participation, interpersonal relationships, professional development and housing stability. The Tribunal therefore found that the applicant had achieved effective social integration incompatible, under the applicable law, with expulsion or removal.

The judgment thus supports a principle that should inform the future development of immigration law: entry alone is not sufficient to create an unconditional right to remain, but removal cannot be ordered as though the life built by the individual in the host country had no legal significance.

The State must govern both admission and residence. It must determine who may enter, but it must also evaluate who integrates, who contributes to the community, who respects the legal order and who has developed a private life deserving protection. At the same time, it must retain the capacity to adopt effective and proportionate return decisions in relation to those who have no legal entitlement to remain and have not achieved a legally relevant level of integration.

Complementary protection can form part of such a system, provided that it is transformed neither into a permanent regularisation mechanism nor into an empty residual guarantee. It should operate as an instrument for the concrete assessment of the individual and as a limit on the State’s power to remove without considering the social reality developed over time.

The “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione” paradigm does not offer an ideological choice between openness and closure. It proposes a criterion of responsibility.

Foreign nationals must be given a genuine opportunity to integrate, but integration must also be recognised as an individual responsibility. Those who demonstrate over time that they have established an autonomous life, respected the legal order and participated in society should be able to have that process legally recognised. Those who do not undertake that process, and who are not protected by constitutional, international or European obligations, cannot regard residence as automatically irreversible.

The real alternative is not between reception and return. It is between a migration policy that refuses to distinguish among individual situations and a policy capable of evaluating actual outcomes.

The judgment of the Tribunal of Venice demonstrates that immigration law already contains the conceptual tools required to make this distinction. The next step is to transform those tools from remedies applied after an administrative refusal into ordinary components of a coherent system for governing migration.

Fabio Loscerbo
Attorney admitted to practise before the Italian Supreme Court
Registered representative of interests before the Italian Chamber of Deputies in the field of immigration
Registered in the European Union Transparency Register, No. 280782895721-36, in the field of migration and asylum
ORCID: 0009-0004-7030-0428

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