The “Albania Case” highlights a structural contradiction that is increasingly relevant also in the United Kingdom: governments continue to design migration control tools around deterrence, while the legal framework—both domestic and supranational—requires a rigorous, individualised assessment of each case.
Recent European amendments on “safe countries of origin” (February 2026) aim to accelerate procedures and facilitate returns. At first glance, this approach may appear familiar in a UK context, where policy debates have often centred on fast-track processes and externalisation mechanisms, including proposals similar in structure to offshore processing models. However, the central legal constraint remains the same: categorisation cannot replace individual assessment.
In the UK legal system, this principle is deeply embedded. Decisions relating to removal must comply with obligations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 8 (right to private and family life), as incorporated through the Human Rights Act 1998. Courts consistently require a proportionality assessment, taking into account the individual’s personal circumstances, ties to the country, and degree of integration.
It is precisely this requirement that explains the difficulties observed in the Albanian model. The centres established to process migrants outside national territory were designed to accelerate procedures and, implicitly, to produce a deterrent effect. Yet deterrence, as such, does not constitute a legally sufficient basis for removal. Courts do not evaluate whether a policy discourages arrivals; they assess whether it lawfully justifies the removal of a specific individual.
The consequence is predictable. A system built on presumptions and speed encounters legal resistance. Measures are challenged, decisions are suspended, and the operational mechanism becomes progressively ineffective. The underuse of the Albanian centres is therefore not an administrative anomaly, but the result of a structural legal limitation.
For a UK audience, the parallel is clear. Any attempt to streamline removals without a robust individualised assessment framework is likely to face judicial scrutiny. The more a system relies on automatic assumptions, the more it risks being blocked on proportionality and human rights grounds.
This is where the paradigm “Integration or ReImmigration” becomes relevant. It introduces a structured legal criterion before the enforcement stage. Rather than focusing exclusively on how to remove individuals, it addresses the prior question: on what basis should a person remain or be removed?
Integration, in this framework, is not a vague or political concept. It is defined through measurable elements: employment, language proficiency, and compliance with legal norms. These factors provide a concrete basis for decision-making and allow authorities to distinguish between different situations in a legally defensible way.
Applied to external processing centres, this approach would fundamentally change their function. Instead of serving merely as instruments of deterrence or accelerated processing, they would become locations for rapid integration assessment. Within a short timeframe, authorities could determine whether an individual has developed meaningful ties—making removal potentially disproportionate—or whether such ties are absent, allowing removal to proceed more effectively and with stronger legal justification.
This model is fully consistent with the UK’s legal framework. It aligns with the requirement of proportionality under Article 8 ECHR and reduces the risk of successful legal challenges by grounding decisions in objective and verifiable criteria.
The core point is straightforward. A removals policy cannot function on deterrence alone. Deterrence is a political objective, not a legal standard. Without a clear, structured, and individualised criterion—such as integration—any attempt to enforce removals will remain vulnerable to legal challenge and operational inefficiency.
The Albania Case demonstrates this with clarity. It is not simply the failure of a specific policy instrument, but evidence of a broader conceptual gap. Without integration assessment, there can be no removals policy that is both effective and legally sustainable.
Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register n. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

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