America’s asylum system now contains a striking contradiction: the longer a case remains pending, the more the applicant can be required to pay simply because the case is still pending. The new Annual Asylum Fee, currently $102 for 2026, applies to many Form I-589 cases that remain unresolved for a year or more. At the same time, federal litigation has limited some of the consequences USCIS may impose for nonpayment, while the Board of Immigration Appeals has held in Matter of L-F-R- that, in immigration court, failure to pay by the prescribed deadline can end the asylum claim even though withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture protection must still be considered.
The United States is right to insist that asylum cannot become a system of indefinite provisional residence. A government has a legitimate interest in preventing abuse, requiring applicants to comply with procedures and bringing cases to a final result. But an annual fee tied to the mere passage of time is a weak instrument of migration policy. It does not distinguish a well-founded claim from an unfounded one, a diligent applicant from an obstructive one, or delay caused by the government from delay caused by the applicant. It monetizes pendency instead of resolving it.
The deeper problem is institutional. The current framework produces different practical consequences depending on whether a case is before USCIS or the immigration courts. USCIS is still collecting the annual fee, but a federal court in Massachusetts has enjoined parts of the agency’s April 2026 rule concerning penalties for failure to pay. In removal proceedings, meanwhile, Matter of L-F-R- gives immigration judges a clear rule on the asylum claim while preserving separate protection under withholding and CAT. That fragmentation may be legally explainable, but it is poor public administration. A credible system should make the path from application to final decision clearer, faster and more predictable.
A better model would begin with early identification, security screening and rapid procedural triage, followed by firm adjudication timetables that preserve individual guarantees. Applicants who cooperate with the process should not be trapped for years in administrative limbo. Claims that are manifestly unfounded should be decided quickly, with meaningful review. Complex cases should receive the time necessary for a lawful decision, but not disappear into a backlog without accountability. The central measure of success should be the quality and finality of decisions, not the amount collected from people waiting for them.
For those who are granted protection, the next phase should be equally concrete. Protection should open a structured integration path: English acquisition, lawful employment, education for children, civic orientation, respect for the law and growing economic autonomy. The United States already has a strong civic tradition in its naturalization process. The same seriousness should begin earlier, once the state has decided that a person has a lawful basis to remain. Integration should be supported, but it should also be observable and measurable over time.
For those whose claims are finally rejected after all legal safeguards have been exhausted, the state must also be able to enforce the result. Return policy is part of the credibility of asylum law. That means accurate identity documentation, cooperation with countries of origin, practical use of voluntary departure where appropriate and enforceable removal orders when no lawful basis to stay remains. This is not collective hostility toward migrants. It is the application of individual legal decisions. A system that cannot execute final outcomes eventually loses public confidence, including confidence in protection for those who genuinely need it.
This is where the paradigm of “Integration or ReImmigration” offers a different approach to the American debate. It rejects both permanent administrative ambiguity and indiscriminate collective removal. The state should decide cases, distinguish individual situations, invest in integration when residence is lawful, and make return effective when the legal basis for remaining has ended. Responsibility belongs to institutions as well as applicants: government must decide, applicants must comply, and final decisions must have consequences.
Congress may choose to finance immigration administration through reasonable fees. But fees cannot substitute for governance. America’s asylum problem is not that cases remain pending without producing enough revenue; it is that too many cases remain pending without producing a timely legal answer. The durable reform is therefore not to turn delay into a recurring charge, but to reduce delay, strengthen lawful adjudication, build measurable integration after protection and enforce return after a final denial.
Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Avvocato Cassazionista
Iscritto nel Registro dei rappresentanti di interessi della Camera dei deputati in materia di Immigrazione
Lobbista registrato presso il Registro per la Trasparenza dell’Unione europea n. 280782895721-36 in materia di Migrazione e Asilo
ORCID: 0009-0004-7030-0428
Articolo redatto con l’ausilio di strumenti di AI, sotto la direzione, revisione e responsabilità editoriale dell’autore.
Rispondi