No “Remigration”: the EU Return Regulation adopted on March 26, 2026 strengthens enforcement of returns of irregular migrants — and nothing more

On March 26, 2026, the European Parliament approved a new regulation on the return of third-country nationals staying irregularly within the European Union. In the public debate, this development has quickly been framed—especially in some political circles—as the beginning of a broader policy shift toward what is often labeled “remigration.” From a legal standpoint, however, this interpretation is inaccurate.

The regulation does not redefine who can be removed from EU territory. It does not introduce new categories of deportable individuals, nor does it extend return policies to legally residing migrants or naturalized citizens. Its scope remains strictly limited to individuals who are already unlawfully present under existing EU law. What changes is not the legal basis for removal, but the system’s capacity to actually carry it out.

To understand this, one must look at the structural weaknesses of the previous framework. Under earlier EU rules, return decisions were largely national, fragmented, and often ineffective. Individuals subject to a return order in one Member State could move to another, triggering a new administrative process and delaying enforcement. In practice, this led to low return rates and significant procedural inefficiencies.

The new regulation addresses these issues through a series of operational mechanisms. It introduces mutual recognition of return decisions among Member States, allowing one country to enforce a removal decision issued by another. It reduces automatic suspensive effects, meaning that the mere filing of an appeal does not automatically halt removal unless a specific suspension is granted. It also emphasizes the need for sufficient detention capacity, treating detention not as an exceptional measure, but as a functional component of the return process when necessary.

These changes significantly increase the likelihood that return decisions will be executed. However, they do not alter the fundamental legal boundaries of EU migration law. The regulation remains anchored in the framework of fundamental rights, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The principle of non-refoulement—prohibiting return to a country where an individual faces serious harm—continues to play a central role.

At the same time, protections related to private and family life, typically associated with Article 8 of the Convention, are not removed but are not structurally embedded in the return mechanism. They must be actively invoked and substantiated in individual cases. This reflects a broader shift: the system prioritizes enforceability, while leaving certain rights-based arguments to judicial and administrative processes rather than incorporating them automatically.

This distinction is critical in evaluating claims about “remigration.” In its broader political usage, that concept often implies the removal of individuals regardless of their legal status, integration, or long-term residence. The EU regulation does nothing of the sort. It operates entirely within the existing legal framework and applies only to those who are already subject to return under current law.

What the European Union has done is not to expand its power to remove, but to make that power effective where it already exists. The shift is operational, not ideological. It reflects a policy choice to address the enforcement gap in migration governance, rather than to redefine the conditions under which individuals are allowed to remain.

In short, the regulation does not mark the beginning of “remigration.” It marks the end of a system in which return decisions were often symbolic rather than executable.

Fabio Loscerbo, Attorney at Law
EU Transparency Register No. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

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