Across Europe, the debate on immigration is often framed around two main questions: border control and access to the labour market. Yet another issue—less visible but increasingly decisive—concerns the consequences of failed integration, particularly in terms of public security and long-term costs for the State.
Italy is now approaching a critical phase in this debate. Historically, the country has experienced fewer large-scale urban tensions than some other European states. However, current demographic trends and migration dynamics suggest that the next decade will be decisive.
Using available statistical data and comparisons with other European countries, it is possible to outline a projection of what might happen by 2030 if integration policies remain weak or largely symbolic.
Statistics from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and European datasets published by Eurostat indicate a consistent pattern: when migrant populations remain socially and economically marginal—without language acquisition, stable employment or effective participation in public life—the probability of involvement in minor crime or informal economies tends to increase.
This is not a cultural or ethnic explanation. It is a well-documented sociological phenomenon: long-term marginalisation creates structural instability.
For a British audience, this dynamic is not unfamiliar. The United Kingdom has long debated the relationship between integration, social cohesion and public safety. In several British cities, discussions about parallel communities, urban marginalisation and youth crime have shown how complex integration challenges can become when they remain unresolved over time.
Examples from other European countries illustrate how costly these dynamics can be.
In France, for instance, decades of marginalisation in certain suburban districts—often described as banlieues sensibles—have required major state intervention in policing, justice, urban security and social programmes. Various analyses estimate that the combined public cost of these policies may reach 15 to 20 billion euros per year.
The lesson emerging from these experiences is straightforward: integration failures become significantly more expensive when they are not addressed early.
Applying a simple projection model to Italy allows us to estimate potential future costs. The model combines three key variables: the number of individuals living in conditions of weak integration, the statistical probability of minor offences in marginalised environments and the average cost of criminal proceedings for public finances, including policing, prosecution and detention.
Under a conservative scenario, the economic burden associated with crime linked to social marginalisation could reach between 4 and 7 billion euros annually in Italy by 2030.
These figures include several components: law-enforcement activity, judicial proceedings, prison administration and additional urban security measures required in areas experiencing higher social tension.
Another factor concerns the Italian prison system, which already faces structural pressure. If social marginalisation were to increase significantly, projections suggest that the overall workload for prisons and security forces could grow by 40 to 60 percent within the next decade.
For British observers, the broader question is not unique to Italy. It reflects a challenge faced across many Western democracies: how to balance humanitarian commitments, migration policy and the long-term sustainability of public institutions.
Within the Italian debate, a concept increasingly discussed in legal and policy circles is the paradigm known as “Integrazione o ReImmigrazione”—Integration or Reimmigration.
The principle behind this approach is relatively simple. When a country accepts immigration, it must also ensure that integration effectively takes place. Integration therefore should not be treated merely as a political aspiration but as a measurable and verifiable process.
In practical terms, this means evaluating integration through objective indicators such as knowledge of the national language, participation in legal employment and respect for the fundamental rules of the host society.
If these conditions are met, migration can contribute positively to the economic and social fabric of the country.
However, if these conditions are not achieved within a reasonable period, the legal system should allow authorities to consider Reimmigration, meaning a structured return to the country of origin carried out within the framework of legal guarantees and international law.
Interestingly, Italy already has a legal mechanism that partly reflects this logic. Within the system of complementary protection, a humanitarian residence permit, authorities must already evaluate the level of social integration of the applicant when deciding whether residence should be granted or maintained.
This framework demonstrates that integration can be assessed within the legal system and does not have to remain an abstract political objective.
Strengthening this principle could transform integration into a concrete condition for long-term residence, rather than a purely declaratory policy goal.
For observers in the United Kingdom, the Italian discussion may therefore appear as part of a broader European reflection on migration governance. The central issue is not whether societies should be open or closed, but how they can maintain social cohesion, legal certainty and sustainable public security systems in an era of global mobility.
If integration succeeds, migration can support economic growth and demographic stability.
If integration fails, the costs emerge elsewhere—within policing budgets, criminal justice systems and the broader architecture of public security.
Looking toward 2030, Italy therefore faces a strategic choice. The country can develop a model based on measurable integration and reciprocal responsibility, or it may gradually encounter the structural tensions that have already emerged in other European contexts.
The debate on immigration is therefore not only about migration policy. It also concerns the long-term stability of democratic societies and the future sustainability of public security systems in Europe.
Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Attorney – Lobbyist registered in the European Union Transparency Register
ID 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428
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