Giorno: 14 aprile 2026

In recent years, the French debate on immigration has taken on a level of intensity that is now increasingly visible beyond Europe, including in the United States. What is being discussed in France today is not merely immigration policy, but the structural failure of an entire model: multiculturalism without enforceable obligations.

Public discourse—especially on platforms like X—has amplified theories such as the “Great Replacement,” originally formulated by Renaud Camus and now echoed, in different forms, by political actors such as the Rassemblement National. Regardless of one’s position on these theories, their widespread circulation reflects a deeper reality: a growing perception that integration has failed.

The French government’s response has not been purely rhetorical. The reintroduction of border controls through October 2026, justified on grounds of counterterrorism and rising violence in areas such as Calais and Dunkirk, is a concrete sign that the issue has moved from political debate to state necessity.

Within this context, the idea of “remigration” has gained traction. In its more radical forms, it proposes large-scale returns of migrant populations based on identity-related criteria. From a legal standpoint, however, this approach encounters immediate and insurmountable limits. It conflicts with core principles of Western constitutional systems, including due process, equal protection, and, in the European context, the right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

For an American audience, the issue should be framed clearly: the challenge is not whether immigration should be regulated—it must be—but how to do so within the rule of law.

This is where the concept of an “integration contract” becomes relevant.

The integration contract, as structured in the Italian legal system under Presidential Decree No. 179/2011, provides a model based on conditional residence. It establishes that the right to remain in the country is not automatic or permanent, but contingent upon measurable integration criteria: employment, language proficiency, compliance with the law, and participation in civic life.

This model offers a legally sustainable alternative to both extremes currently dominating the debate.

On one side, the multicultural approach has proven ineffective precisely because it lacks enforceable standards. It assumes integration without requiring it. On the other side, remigration—when framed in identity or ethnic terms—fails to meet the legal thresholds required in democratic systems.

The integration contract introduces a third path: a rule-based system where individual behavior determines legal status.

In practical terms, this means that residence rights are continuously assessed. Those who demonstrate integration maintain their legal status. Those who fail to meet these obligations face the legal consequence of removal. This is what can be defined as “ReImmigration”: not a political slogan, but a juridical outcome grounded in objective criteria.

For the United States, this approach resonates with familiar legal principles. Immigration law has always included elements of conditionality—whether through visa compliance, work authorization, or naturalization requirements. However, what is often missing is a coherent, system-wide framework that explicitly links long-term residence to measurable integration.

The French case illustrates what happens in the absence of such a framework: polarization, institutional strain, and the rise of legally problematic solutions.

The lesson is straightforward. Immigration systems cannot function on assumptions alone. They require enforceable rules, clear expectations, and predictable consequences. Without this structure, the system either collapses into disorder or shifts toward measures that cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The integration contract, understood as a legal instrument rather than a political concept, offers a way to restore balance. It aligns immigration control with the rule of law, ensuring that rights are preserved while responsibilities are enforced.

Ultimately, the real alternative to remigration is not inaction or denial, but the construction of a legal system where integration is not optional—and where failure to integrate has clear, lawful consequences.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register No. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

• Integration Contract vs. Remigration: A Legal Framework for the French Crisis – Lessons for the United States
• EU Return Hubs 2026: why the German-Dutch model needs an integration contract
• Remigration vs Reimmigration: Two Competing Models in Europe After the EU Elections
• Albania Case: Why Without Integration Assessment There Can Be No Effective Deportation Policy
• Remigration in Europa: Was Martin Sellners Theorie wirklich vorschlägt – und wie sich das Paradigma „Integration oder ReImmigration“ unterscheidet

In recent months, a clear political direction has emerged within the European Union: externalizing migration control through the creation of return hubs in third countries. A coalition led by Germany and the Netherlands, alongside Austria, Denmark, and Greece, is actively exploring agreements with countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Tunisia. Italy’s arrangement with Albania has already demonstrated that what once seemed politically unfeasible is now becoming operational reality.

For a U.S. audience, this debate may sound familiar. It echoes long-standing discussions about offshore processing, third-country agreements, and the tension between border enforcement and due process. But the European case presents a distinct legal and structural problem: the system is being built without a coherent internal mechanism to evaluate integration over time.

That is the core issue.

Return hubs are, by design, reactive tools. They intervene at the final stage of the migration cycle—when an individual has already lost legal status or is deemed removable. In other words, they manage failure. What they do not address is how to prevent that failure in the first place.

This creates three major weaknesses.

First, a structural inefficiency. If the only mechanism available is removal after the fact, the system will inevitably be overwhelmed. Without a prior filter, every case—integrated or not—risks ending up in the same enforcement pipeline.

Second, high financial and political costs. Offshore centers require complex bilateral agreements, sustained funding, and diplomatic trade-offs. As seen in comparable discussions in the United States, these arrangements are not only expensive but also politically fragile.

Third—and most importantly—a legal risk. Human rights organizations have already warned that such hubs may become “legal black holes,” where access to legal remedies is limited and procedural guarantees are weakened. For European systems bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, this is not a marginal concern—it is a structural vulnerability.

The problem, therefore, is not the existence of return hubs per se. The problem is that they are being developed in isolation, without a preventive legal framework capable of distinguishing, in a transparent and objective way, who should remain and who should not.

This is where the Italian model offers an overlooked solution.

Italy already has a legal instrument that introduces a fundamentally different logic: the integration contract, established by Presidential Decree No. 179 of 2011. Unlike static immigration systems that grant or deny status at a single point in time, this mechanism creates a dynamic, ongoing evaluation of integration.

It is based on measurable criteria: employment, language proficiency, and respect for the law. These are not ideological benchmarks but concrete indicators that can be verified over time. The right to remain is therefore not automatic or permanent—it is conditioned on a continuous process of integration.

From a U.S. perspective, this resembles a hybrid between a points-based system and conditional residency, but with a stronger emphasis on ongoing compliance rather than initial selection.

If integrated into the broader European framework, such a mechanism would fundamentally change the role of return hubs. Instead of being emergency tools used after systemic failure, they would become the final step in a structured process—applied only after a clear, documented, and periodically verified lack of integration.

This would also address one of the main criticisms raised by NGOs: the absence of transparent criteria. A system based on periodic verification reduces arbitrariness, strengthens legal certainty, and ensures that decisions are grounded in objective factors rather than discretionary assessments.

The key point is simple, but often overlooked.

Migration policy cannot rely solely on border control and removal mechanisms. It must also define, in legal terms, what it means to integrate—and it must verify that integration over time.

Without this, return hubs risk becoming expensive, legally contested, and ultimately ineffective instruments.

With it, they can be part of a coherent system.

The European debate is now entering a decisive phase. The question is not whether return hubs will be implemented—they already are. The real question is whether Europe will equip itself with the legal tools necessary to make them sustainable.

In this context, the Italian integration contract is not just a national instrument. It is a model that deserves serious consideration at the transatlantic level.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register No. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

• Integration Contract vs. Remigration: A Legal Framework for the French Crisis – Lessons for the United States
• EU Return Hubs 2026: why the German-Dutch model needs an integration contract
• Remigration vs Reimmigration: Two Competing Models in Europe After the EU Elections
• Albania Case: Why Without Integration Assessment There Can Be No Effective Deportation Policy
• Remigration in Europa: Was Martin Sellners Theorie wirklich vorschlägt – und wie sich das Paradigma „Integration oder ReImmigration“ unterscheidet

In the aftermath of the latest European Parliament elections, immigration has once again moved to the center of political and legal debate across Europe. What is emerging, however, is not simply a disagreement over policy choices, but a deeper clash between fundamentally different models of how migration should be governed.

On one side, the concept of remigration has gained visibility, particularly in France and Germany, and increasingly resonates in broader European discussions. On the other, a different framework is taking shape—what can be defined as Reimmigration—a model grounded not in identity, but in law, individual conduct, and measurable integration.

To understand the divide, it is necessary to start from the origins of remigration.

In its contemporary European usage, remigration is closely linked to the theory of “ethnic replacement,” widely known in France as the Grand Remplacement. This theory argues that immigration flows are leading to a gradual demographic and cultural substitution of native European populations. From this premise derives the idea that large numbers of migrants—and in some interpretations even naturalized citizens or long-term residents—should be encouraged or compelled to return to their countries of origin.

This approach operates primarily at a collective level. It is not centered on the legal status or individual behavior of a person, but rather on broader concerns about demographic balance, cultural identity, and social cohesion. That is precisely where it encounters its main legal obstacle.

European legal systems—unlike political discourse—are built on individual rights. The European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 8, protects private and family life and requires that any decision affecting a person’s right to remain must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Generalized removals or policies based on abstract categories would not withstand judicial scrutiny under current European standards.

For an American audience, this tension is not unfamiliar. It mirrors, in some respects, the constitutional constraints placed on immigration enforcement in the United States, where due process, equal protection, and individualized adjudication play a central role. The difference is that, in Europe, these principles are further reinforced by supranational courts and binding human rights instruments.

As a result, remigration—while politically powerful and increasingly discussed—remains legally fragile. It lacks a clear pathway for implementation within the existing European legal framework.

This is where the concept of Reimmigration becomes relevant.

Reimmigration is not based on identity or origin, but on behavior and integration. It does not seek to redefine who belongs, but to establish clear legal criteria for who is entitled to remain. It operates within the boundaries of existing law, particularly through instruments such as complementary protection under Italian immigration law and the broader framework of Article 8 ECHR.

Under this model, the right to stay is not unconditional. It is the outcome of a verifiable process of integration, assessed through objective indicators: employment, language acquisition, respect for legal norms, and social participation. At the same time, the loss of these conditions may legitimately lead to the termination of the right to remain, provided that due process and proportionality are respected.

The distinction is crucial. While remigration approaches migration as a structural or demographic problem, Reimmigration treats it as a legal relationship between the individual and the host state—one that evolves over time and must be continuously justified.

Recent political developments in France, Germany, and even the United Kingdom—where parties such as Reform UK have gained traction—demonstrate that immigration is no longer a marginal issue. It has become a structural question for Western democracies. Yet the risk is that political responses outpace legal feasibility.

Remigration offers a direct and emotionally compelling answer, but one that struggles to translate into enforceable law. Reimmigration, by contrast, may appear less immediate, but it provides a legally sustainable framework capable of balancing state interests with fundamental rights.

For policymakers and observers in the United States, the European debate offers an important lesson. Immigration systems cannot be governed solely by political narratives. They require legal architectures that are both enforceable and compatible with constitutional and human rights standards.

The real issue is not whether migrants should stay or be removed. The real issue is under what legal conditions those decisions are made—and whether those conditions can withstand judicial scrutiny.

In this respect, the European debate is at a crossroads. Remigration remains a political concept in search of legal grounding. Reimmigration, on the other hand, represents an attempt to build that grounding within the rule of law.

Fabio Loscerbo, Attorney at Law
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register n. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

• Integration Contract vs. Remigration: A Legal Framework for the French Crisis – Lessons for the United States
• EU Return Hubs 2026: why the German-Dutch model needs an integration contract
• Remigration vs Reimmigration: Two Competing Models in Europe After the EU Elections
• Albania Case: Why Without Integration Assessment There Can Be No Effective Deportation Policy
• Remigration in Europa: Was Martin Sellners Theorie wirklich vorschlägt – und wie sich das Paradigma „Integration oder ReImmigration“ unterscheidet

The so-called “Albania Case” offers a useful lens for a U.S. audience to understand a structural problem that is not limited to Europe, but is increasingly relevant across Western legal systems: you cannot build an effective deportation policy if you do not first establish a clear legal criterion to distinguish who should remain and who should be removed.

In recent months, the European Union has introduced new amendments on the concept of “safe countries of origin” (February 2026), aiming to accelerate asylum procedures and facilitate returns. On paper, this looks familiar to American observers: it resembles efforts to streamline removals through categorical assumptions about country conditions. However, in practice, the system continues to face a fundamental legal constraint—individualized assessment.

European courts, and particularly the Court of Justice of the European Union, have consistently reinforced a principle that is well known also in U.S. immigration law: you cannot rely on automatic or generalized assumptions when fundamental rights are at stake. Every individual case requires a concrete evaluation. This is precisely where the Albania model begins to break down.

Italy attempted to externalize part of its migration management by establishing processing centers in Albania. These centers were designed to accelerate procedures and, implicitly, to create a deterrent effect. But deterrence, as a policy objective, does not translate into a sufficient legal justification. Courts do not evaluate whether a system is politically effective; they evaluate whether it is legally sound.

As a result, the Albanian centers are increasingly underutilized. The issue is not logistical inefficiency—it is legal fragility. If each case must be assessed individually, then a system built on fast-track processing and presumptions cannot sustain itself under judicial scrutiny. This produces delays, suspensions, and ultimately a paralysis of the deportation mechanism.

For a U.S. audience, the parallel is clear. In the United States, removal proceedings already hinge on individualized determinations—whether based on asylum eligibility, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Any attempt to bypass that individualized framework would immediately face constitutional and judicial challenges. Europe is now encountering the same structural limit.

The real issue, therefore, is not how to make deportations faster, but how to make them legally sustainable. This is where the paradigm of “Integration or Reimmigration” becomes relevant.

Instead of focusing exclusively on enforcement at the final stage, this approach introduces a prior, structured assessment of integration. Integration is not treated as a vague social concept, but as a measurable legal criterion: employment, language proficiency, and compliance with legal norms. These elements allow authorities to determine, on an objective basis, whether an individual has developed sufficient ties to justify remaining in the country.

In practical terms, this changes everything. Facilities like those in Albania would no longer function as mere holding or processing centers. They would become sites for rapid integration assessment. Within a short timeframe, authorities could distinguish between individuals who have established meaningful connections—making removal potentially disproportionate—and those who have not, for whom removal can proceed more efficiently and with stronger legal grounding.

This model aligns with fundamental legal principles. It preserves individualized assessment, reduces reliance on presumptions, and strengthens the defensibility of removal decisions in court. At the same time, it enhances the effectiveness of enforcement by focusing resources on cases where removal is legally sustainable.

The key takeaway is straightforward. Deportation policy cannot function in a legal vacuum. Deterrence alone is not a legal standard; it is a political goal. Without a clear, structured, and individualized criterion—such as integration—any system of removals will inevitably face judicial resistance and operational failure.

The Albania Case demonstrates this with clarity. It is not simply a failed experiment in externalization. It is evidence that without a prior assessment of integration, no deportation policy—whether in Europe or elsewhere—can truly work.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register n. 280782895721-36
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

• Integration Contract vs. Remigration: A Legal Framework for the French Crisis – Lessons for the United States
• EU Return Hubs 2026: why the German-Dutch model needs an integration contract
• Remigration vs Reimmigration: Two Competing Models in Europe After the EU Elections
• Albania Case: Why Without Integration Assessment There Can Be No Effective Deportation Policy
• Remigration in Europa: Was Martin Sellners Theorie wirklich vorschlägt – und wie sich das Paradigma „Integration oder ReImmigration“ unterscheidet

In den letzten Jahren hat der Begriff Remigration im europäischen Migrationsdiskurs zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit erlangt. Besonders in deutschsprachigen Ländern wird er intensiv diskutiert. Der Begriff ist eng mit dem österreichischen Aktivisten Martin Sellner verbunden, einer zentralen Figur der identitären Bewegung und ehemaligem Leiter der Identitäre Bewegung Österreich.

Sellner hat seine Ideen vor allem in dem Buch Remigration: A Proposal formuliert, in dem er eine strategische Antwort auf die demografischen und gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen vorschlägt, die nach seiner Auffassung durch die Migration der letzten Jahrzehnte in Europa entstanden sind.

Für ein deutsches Publikum ist diese Debatte besonders relevant. Deutschland steht seit Jahren im Zentrum der europäischen Migrationspolitik, insbesondere seit der sogenannten „Flüchtlingskrise“ von 2015. Fragen nach Integration, sozialem Zusammenhalt und staatlicher Steuerung von Migration prägen weiterhin den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Diskurs.

Die Theorie der Remigration versucht auf diese Fragen eine radikale Antwort zu geben. Nach Sellners Konzept beschränkt sich Remigration nicht nur auf die Rückführung irregulärer Migranten. Vielmehr versteht er darunter ein umfassendes politisches Projekt, das darauf abzielt, die demografischen Folgen der Masseneinwanderung teilweise rückgängig zu machen.

Dieses Projekt umfasst mehrere Elemente: eine deutlich strengere Kontrolle der Außengrenzen, eine Neubewertung bestehender Aufenthaltsrechte und Programme zur Rückführung von Migranten, die nach dieser Theorie als nicht ausreichend assimiliert gelten.

Der Kern dieser Argumentation ist kultureller Natur. Sellner geht davon aus, dass europäische Gesellschaften durch Migration aus Regionen mit anderen religiösen, sprachlichen und sozialen Traditionen tiefgreifend verändert werden. Remigration wird in diesem Kontext als Instrument verstanden, um das historische kulturelle Gleichgewicht der europäischen Nationen wiederherzustellen.

Gerade in Deutschland stößt ein solcher Ansatz jedoch auf erhebliche rechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen. Das deutsche Rechtssystem basiert auf starken Garantien für Grundrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Darüber hinaus ist Deutschland Teil eines komplexen europäischen Rechtsrahmens, der sowohl durch die European Union als auch durch Institutionen wie den Council of Europe geprägt ist.

Diese Rechtsordnung schützt unter anderem das Familienleben, die Gleichbehandlung sowie die rechtliche Stabilität eines einmal erlangten Aufenthaltsstatus. Daher wirft jede politische Strategie, die eine großflächige Rückführung von langfristig ansässigen Migranten vorsieht, erhebliche verfassungsrechtliche und europarechtliche Fragen auf.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist im italienischen juristischen Diskurs ein anderes Konzept entstanden: das Paradigma „Integration oder ReImmigration“.

Dieses Paradigma betrachtet Migration nicht primär als kulturelles oder identitäres Problem, sondern als eine Frage der staatlichen Steuerung und des Rechts.

Der zentrale Gedanke lautet: Integration muss zu einer überprüfbaren Voraussetzung für den dauerhaften Aufenthalt werden.

Nach diesem Ansatz wird nicht die Herkunft einer Person bewertet, sondern ihre tatsächliche Teilnahme am gesellschaftlichen Leben des Aufnahmelandes. Integration zeigt sich in konkreten Faktoren wie Erwerbstätigkeit, Kenntnis der Sprache und Respekt gegenüber der Rechtsordnung.

Wenn Integration stattfindet, hat der Staat ein klares Interesse daran, den Aufenthaltsstatus zu stabilisieren, beispielsweise durch reguläre Aufenthaltstitel oder Formen des ergänzenden Schutzes.

Wenn Integration jedoch nicht gelingt, muss das Rechtssystem geordnete Verfahren für die Rückkehr in das Herkunftsland vorsehen. Dieser Prozess wird im Paradigma als ReImmigration bezeichnet.

Dabei handelt es sich nicht um ein identitäres oder ethnisches Konzept. ReImmigration ist vielmehr als rechtliches Instrument zur Steuerung von Migration gedacht, das in Fällen angewendet wird, in denen Integration objektiv nicht erreicht wird.

Der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Ansätzen ist daher grundlegend.

Die Theorie der Remigration konzentriert sich vor allem auf Fragen der kulturellen Identität und der demografischen Entwicklung. Das Paradigma Integration oder ReImmigration hingegen stellt die individuelle Integration als entscheidendes rechtliches Kriterium in den Mittelpunkt.

Mit anderen Worten: Nicht Herkunft oder Religion sind entscheidend, sondern die Frage, ob eine Person zu einem aktiven und gesetzestreuen Mitglied der Gesellschaft geworden ist.

Gerade für Deutschland, das seit Jahrzehnten ein Einwanderungsland ist, könnte diese Perspektive eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Die zentrale Herausforderung besteht nicht nur darin, Migration zu begrenzen oder zu fördern, sondern darin, Integration tatsächlich messbar und politisch steuerbar zu machen.

Solange diese Frage nicht klar beantwortet wird, wird die europäische Migrationspolitik weiterhin zwischen zwei Extremen schwanken: zwischen Systemen, die Migration zulassen, ohne Integration effektiv zu steuern, und radikalen Vorschlägen, die mit den Grundprinzipien des Rechtsstaats kollidieren können.

Das Paradigma Integration oder ReImmigration versucht daher, einen dritten Weg zu formulieren: ein Modell, das Migration ermöglicht, aber gleichzeitig klare rechtliche Erwartungen an Integration stellt und im Falle ihres Scheiterns geordnete Rückkehrmechanismen vorsieht.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbista registrato presso il Registro per la Trasparenza dell’Unione Europea – ID 280782895721-36

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

Depuis quelques années, un terme autrefois marginal dans le débat politique européen s’est imposé dans les discussions publiques : la remigration. Pour de nombreux observateurs, y compris en France, il s’agit d’un mot qui suscite immédiatement des réactions fortes, souvent opposées. Certains y voient une réponse radicale à l’échec des politiques migratoires européennes, tandis que d’autres considèrent le concept comme incompatible avec les principes juridiques fondamentaux des démocraties européennes.

Pour comprendre pourquoi la remigration divise aujourd’hui l’Europe, il faut replacer ce débat dans son contexte historique et politique. Depuis les années 1990, les pays européens ont connu une augmentation importante des flux migratoires, liée à plusieurs facteurs : les crises humanitaires, les conflits internationaux, la mobilité économique et les mécanismes de regroupement familial. Dans le même temps, les politiques d’intégration ont produit des résultats très différents selon les pays et les territoires.

Dans certaines grandes villes européennes, la question de l’intégration est devenue un sujet central du débat public. Des phénomènes de ségrégation urbaine, de tensions sociales ou de formation de communautés parallèles ont alimenté la perception selon laquelle les politiques migratoires mises en place au cours des dernières décennies n’ont pas toujours permis de construire une intégration durable.

C’est dans ce contexte que le concept de remigration a gagné en visibilité. Il est souvent associé aux travaux et aux positions de l’activiste autrichien Martin Sellner, figure importante du mouvement identitaire européen. Dans sa formulation la plus radicale, la remigration ne concerne pas seulement le retour des migrants en situation irrégulière – ce qui existe déjà dans tous les systèmes juridiques européens – mais vise également, selon ses promoteurs, les personnes considérées comme insuffisamment intégrées dans la société d’accueil.

C’est précisément cet aspect qui provoque la division du débat européen.

Les partisans de la remigration soutiennent que l’Europe doit affronter une crise de cohésion sociale. Selon eux, l’accumulation de flux migratoires importants combinée à des politiques d’intégration jugées inefficaces aurait créé des tensions croissantes dans certaines sociétés européennes. Dans cette perspective, la remigration est présentée comme un instrument politique destiné à restaurer l’équilibre social et culturel.

Les critiques, au contraire, soulignent immédiatement les obstacles juridiques considérables qu’un tel projet rencontrerait. Le droit européen, mais aussi les constitutions nationales, protègent fortement le droit au respect de la vie familiale, la stabilité du statut de séjour et le principe de non-discrimination. Une politique visant à éloigner des personnes en fonction de critères culturels ou identitaires entrerait donc en tension avec les principes fondamentaux de l’État de droit.

La division actuelle en Europe ne concerne donc pas seulement une politique migratoire particulière. Elle révèle une question plus profonde : comment les sociétés européennes doivent-elles gouverner l’immigration dans les décennies à venir ?

Face à cette polarisation, certains proposent d’explorer des approches alternatives fondées sur des critères juridiques plus précis. Parmi celles-ci figure le paradigme de l’Intégration ou ReImmigration, qui propose une logique différente.

Contrairement à la remigration, qui part de l’idée d’un retour massif comme solution principale, ce modèle repose sur une logique conditionnelle. Le droit de rester durablement dans le pays d’accueil n’est pas considéré comme automatique, mais lié à un processus réel d’intégration.

L’intégration, dans cette perspective, n’est pas une notion abstraite. Elle repose sur des éléments concrets : la participation au travail, la connaissance de la langue du pays et le respect des règles fondamentales de la société d’accueil. Lorsque ces conditions sont remplies, l’ordre juridique peut reconnaître des formes de stabilisation du séjour, comme la protection complémentaire ou d’autres statuts juridiques permettant une intégration durable.

Lorsque l’intégration ne se réalise pas, le système doit prévoir des mécanismes de retour ordonné vers le pays d’origine. C’est ce que ce paradigme appelle la ReImmigration, conçue non comme un projet idéologique mais comme un instrument de gestion juridique des politiques migratoires.

Le débat sur la remigration révèle ainsi une transformation plus large du modèle migratoire européen. Après plusieurs décennies durant lesquelles l’immigration a souvent été abordée principalement sous l’angle humanitaire ou économique, les sociétés européennes cherchent aujourd’hui un nouvel équilibre entre ouverture, cohésion sociale et sécurité juridique.

La question centrale n’est donc pas seulement de savoir si la remigration est possible ou souhaitable. La véritable question est de déterminer quel modèle de gouvernance de l’immigration l’Europe souhaite construire pour l’avenir.

Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbiste – Registre de transparence de l’Union européenne
ID 280782895721-36

ORCID : https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428