What the Bologna Court’s decree of 16 January 2026 tells us about conditional stay, integration and return
In the UK debate on immigration, forms of humanitarian protection are often viewed through the lens of asylum, discretionary leave, or human-rights-based barriers to removal. When observed from this perspective, the Italian notion of complementary protection can easily be misunderstood as a residual right to remain once removal becomes politically or socially difficult. The decree issued by the Tribunale di Bologna on 16 January 2026 offers a markedly different and far more legally disciplined reading.
In the Italian legal framework, complementary protection is not a pathway to settlement and not an alternative asylum status. Its function is closer to what British lawyers would recognise as a human-rights constraint on removal, operating only where expulsion would lead to a concrete breach of constitutional or international obligations. It is a safeguard against disproportionate outcomes, not a general immigration policy tool.
The Bologna Court makes this point with clarity. Complementary protection does not arise automatically from presence on the territory, nor from the mere invocation of private or family life. It requires a fact-specific assessment, grounded in evidence, demonstrating that removal would interfere in a disproportionate manner with a private life that has already taken shape in a real and structured way within the host country.
For a UK audience, the Court’s approach will sound familiar. The concept of “private life”, derived from Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, is treated not as a subjective claim but as an objective legal reality. What matters is not how long a person has been in the country, but what they have actually built there. Lawful and continuous employment, economic self-sufficiency, housing stability, participation in training or social structures, and overall compliance with the legal order are all assessed as indicators of genuine integration.
Crucially, the Court does not treat these factors as moral merits or compassionate considerations. They function as legal evidence. Integration is not an aspiration; it is a condition that must be demonstrated. Without such proof, the claim to complementary protection remains speculative and insufficient to block removal.
The decree is equally firm in defining limits. Time spent in Italy, even if lengthy, does not in itself create a right to stay. The absence of family ties in the country of origin is not decisive. Most importantly, the Court reiterates a principle well understood in the UK legal tradition: human rights law does not confer a general right to choose one’s country of residence. States retain the authority to regulate entry and stay, provided that removal decisions respect legality and proportionality.
It is within this framework that the relationship between complementary protection and ReImmigration becomes clear. ReImmigration does not deny protection where protection is genuinely required. Nor does it reject human-rights obligations. Instead, it restores a principle of conditionality. Stay is not presumed; it follows from integration that is real, verifiable and consistent with the legal order. Where such integration exists, complementary protection can legitimately operate as a barrier to disproportionate removal. Where it does not, return is not a failure of the system, but its intended outcome.
From a UK perspective, this logic closely resembles the distinction between discretionary leave grounded in demonstrable circumstances and blanket regularisation detached from conduct and contribution. The Bologna decree firmly rejects the latter. It confirms that humanitarian constraints must remain bounded, evidence-based and compatible with effective migration control.
What emerges is a model that avoids both extremes often present in public debate. It neither dissolves enforcement in the name of abstract rights nor reduces migration governance to mere coercion. Instead, it articulates a rule-based equilibrium in which rights are protected, but permanence is earned.
For British readers, the significance of the decree lies precisely here. It demonstrates that respect for human rights and control over immigration are not mutually exclusive. Complementary protection defines the legal limits within which the state must operate; ReImmigration reaffirms that remaining within the country is conditional upon integration and responsibility. Together, they form a coherent framework that strengthens the credibility of the rule of law while preserving its humanitarian core.
The Bologna Court’s decree of 16 January 2026 does not introduce a new doctrine. It confirms an existing one with judicial authority: integration first, permanence second; failing integration, lawful return. Not as an ideological stance, but as a consequence of legal coherence.
Avv. Fabio Loscerbo
Lobbyist – EU Transparency Register
ID 280782895721-36
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